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International Civil Litigation in United States
Courts: Commentary and Materials
By Gary B. Born and David Westin. Deventer, The Netherlands, and Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 2d ed. 1992, pp. xxvi, 928
(including appendices), $85.00.
International Litigation and Arbitration
By Andreas F. Lowenfeld. St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co. (American
Casebook Series), 1993, pp. xxvi, 869, $45.95 (with a separately bound volume
of SELECTED TREATIES, STATUTES AND RULES, pp. vii, 277, $14.95).
Lawyers and law students unacquainted with international law may be tempted
to think that it is as dry as dust, but the compelling episodes of international
litigation set forth in the books reviewed below suggest that this view is misguided.
During an interlude in the background work for this review, I had the diverting
experience of reading John Mortimer's review of a new biography about the late
publisher Robert Maxwell.' The review's excellence caused me some regret, first
because of my well-founded conviction that I could never write a review ably
enough to be permitted to refill John Mortimer's inkwell, and also because of my
expectation that the lengthy books I was about to review would fail to present any
subjects as meaty as "Captain" Bob Maxwell and his exploits.
1. John Mortimer, Call Him Irresistible, THE NEW YORKER, May 31, 1993, at 163. Mortimer
conjures up the subject with great clarity, if not much charity: "the monstrous creation that was the
late, unlamented Mr. Robert Maxwell," a "liar and a fraud," a "sadistic tyrant..." are samples.
Id. at 163. An acute aversion to odiousness permeates the piece, and rarely has the maxim de morruis
nil nisi bonum been trampled on with such vigor.
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The regret was only half justified, because almost immediately upon returning
to work on this review I encountered the tale of a grotesque escapade revolving
around claims that Maxwell had engaged in a major fraud in the sale to a Saul
Steinberg company of Pergamon Press Limited stock.2 To be sure, these particular
Maxwell proceedings might have held scant interest for Mr. Mortimer's Rumpole,
for the battle unfolded in civil courts without any indication in the case reports
of a need for the services of an "Old Bailey hack." Yet despite my pessimistic
expectations, here the central figure of the Mortimer review loomed once again,
large as ever, in an international law book. And what a story it was: flights to
London, flights to New York, meetings in hotel rooms, obedient minions, dark
deeds alleged, millions at stake. In short, materials in the books under review
illustrate that issues of international law do not arise in a laboratory environment
but frequently occur as a result of real disputes involving formidable stakes and
clashes between people who have been operating on a scale beyond the mundane.
This is not to say that these books are entertainment. They are works of solid
scholarship, but each has succeeded ably in making the subject matter seem
anything but arid.3
Considerations of international law continue to play a substantial role in civil
litigation in the United States, a phenomenon reflected by cases noted in the works
under review. In the last decade, for example, the Supreme Court of the United
States has issued judgments in numerous cases dealing with a variety of interna-
tional civil litigation problems.4 The federal courts of appeals and the district
2. See Lowenfeld, p. 68 (The Search for Criteria), which presents Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
3. The authors collectively offer much more than Maxwell, for example, the Marc Rich litigation,
in which steamer trunks full of documents being sought by the authorities were about to be spirited
out of the country by a paralegal, when the plane on which they were loaded was stopped at the last
moment before takeoff by the Kennedy Airport tower, and the documents were seized back at the
gate (see Lowenfeld, p. 801); the litigation aftermath of the U.S. Government's post-World War II
seizure of the assets "of the notorious I.G. Farben enterprise which had been one of the main engines
of the German war machine" (Lowenfeld, p. 694); "the most tragic industrial disaster in history"
(Born & Westin, p. 307, quoting In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), which is excerpted there); efforts to redress "a cold-blooded assassination on
Massachusetts Avenue in Washington of the [former] foreign minister of Chile" (Lowenfeld, p. 661;
see Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985);
see also Born & Westin, pp. 519-22); and the ports of Nigeria becoming "bottlenecked with hundreds
of ships carrying cargoes of cement" improvidently ordered by that country in the mid-1970s (Born
& Westin, p. 465, quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), which is excerpted there).
4. A nonexhaustive list includes Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480(1983)
(jurisdiction in suits by foreign parties under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (in personam jurisdiction); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court,
480 U.S. 102 (1987) (in personam jurisdiction); Socidtt Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. U.S.
Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987) (Hague Evidence Convention); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft
v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988) (Hague Service Convention); W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environ-
mental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990) (act of state doctrine); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
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courts, as well as state courts, have been similarly busy with the impact of
international issues on civil litigation over the same period.
Even from the nation's beginning, international issues have been addressed by
U.S. courts. Indeed, the 1812 case of The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon5 (a
sovereign immunity decision) is "one of the early instances of the influence of
the U.S. Supreme Court on the rest of the world."-6 As the nation expanded to
the west, the likelihood diminished that a substantial percentage of U.S. lawyers
or their clients would have encounters with international law. Some lawyers near
the seaboard might deal with maritime law and international trade, but few inland
attorneys ordinarily would have the same opportunities.
The radically advanced transportation, communications, information, and in-
vestment systems of the present era have of course transformed this scene. No
longer is the impact of international law remote or irrelevant. Today it is not
unusual for a German or Japanese company to explore opening a new facility in
mid-America and fly its experts to the heartland to negotiate with local officials.
With the generally contemporaneous, if coincidental, growth in the modem inter-
nationalization in commerce and the development of products liability law, it is
not particularly surprising when an injury in Boise or Binghamton results from
a product manufactured abroad. The local bar and bench then apply themselves
to acquire, for legal proceedings in their own states, the requisite learning with
regard to international issues such as jurisdiction, discovery, service of process,
and enforcement of judgments. Moreover, sales contracts, turnkey projects, and
other agreements with increasing frequency will present local lawyers throughout
the country with a variety of international issues, such as forum selection and
long-arm jurisdiction. And these situations are only illustrative.
International law need not be a forbidding unknown to a civil litigator in the
United States. In approaching a number of aspects of international law, lawyers
trained in the U.S. legal system enjoy a potential advantage of which they may
be largely unaware. Many of them have already studied, or have had practical
exposure to, problems that entail, on a purely domestic level, conflict of laws,
forum selection, sovereign immunity, personal jurisdiction for acts outside the
forum, and discovery-taking outside the forum. Minus the unifying overlay of
federalism, these concepts and more are also familiar in international civil litiga-
tion, though often dressed in substantially different clothing. To be familiar with
the domestic version of these concepts does not make one a fully versed interna-
tional litigator (and to be under that illusion is dangerous). A significant part of
the basic learning of a U.S. lawyer can, however, be of help in gaining an
Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (forum selection clauses); Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 112
S. Ct. 2160 (1992), and Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993) (foreign sovereign immunity);
Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1178 (1993) (extraterritorial effect of U.S. statute).
5. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
6. Lowenfeld, p. 583.
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understanding of international law as it bears on U.S. litigation. The situation is
perhaps comparable to learning a foreign language that shares a sizeable portion
of its vocabulary and grammar with one's native language: fluency in one's native
language will not translate to fluency in the new language, but it can provide a
good head start.
In addition to this built-in edge held by many U.S. civil trial lawyers are the
opportunities afforded by the literature in the field. Works such as those reviewed
here are indispensable aids to litigators who desire to become more conversant
with the aspects of international law that may come into play in their practices.
Each of the books warrants separate discussion. Their aggregate length and
detail rule out a page-by-page or citation-by-citation critique, and accordingly
this review considers them from a wider perspective. 7 This discussion of the
respective books can do no more than focus on aspects of their individual treatment
of selected topics, which will give the reader at least a sample on which to base
an assessment.
I. Born and Westin
This book is the second edition of a well-received works that in this edition has
become even better. 9 The discussion is detailed, thorough, and liberally footnoted.
The writing is clear and fresh.
Born and Westin aim their book at both private practitioners and law school
professors. Thus, it offers a varied menu to readers. It unites the text of a standard
treatise with case extracts and with problems that are typical of those presented
in casebooks, which invite the reader to become engaged more deeply in consider-
ing the questions under discussion. The chapters and subchapters typically begin
with an extensive analysis and discussion of the background of the issues presented
and of the state of the law on the subject under discussion, and proceed to present
portions of important cases. Thoughtful questions and useful critiques are then
put forth for the consideration of readers who have an interest in the subject matter
beyond that which can be satisfied by merely skimming the book for black-letter
law.
7. It is not this review's purpose to engage in a "gotcha" game of highlighting the rare misnum-
bered footnote or infelicitous citation. This kind of niggling is undeserved in the case of works so
conspicuous for their overall careful attention to detail.
8. See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471, 1478 (1993), and Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2909 n.22 (1993).
9. The authors were partners in a Washington law firm when the first edition was published.
David Westin is now senior vice president and general counsel of Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. in New
York. Gary Born is now in London as managing partner of his firm's office there. Each is a prolific
writer, and much in demand as a panelist and speaker in the field of international law as it relates
to civil litigation in the United States. Each has dealt in practice with substantial international litigation,
including Socidtd Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987),
and each has been chair of the International Aspects of Litigation Committee of the American Bar
Association's Section of International Law and Practice.
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Chapter 1 presents a general introduction outlining the book's purpose and
scope. It also gives an informative version of public international law and its
relationship to U.S. law in international civil litigation. Chapter 2 deals with
judicial jurisdiction of U.S. courts and treats a comprehensive range of jurisdic-
tional issues, such as long-arm jurisdiction, general jurisdiction, transitory pres-
ence, "tag" service, national contacts, and in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction.
Ten cases (among them, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,'0 and Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court") are excerpted.
Most of the case extracts are followed by further discussion under separate topic
headings helpful in their specificity, 2 and by numerous questions for individual or
classroom consideration. 3 Chapter 3, Service of Process Abroad, includes the
Hague Service Convention and the Inter-American Convention on Letters Roga-
tory as well as case extracts. Supplemental discussion and questions follow the
cases.
In chapter 4, Forum Selection, the authors discuss the interpretation of forum
selection clauses, including issues of exclusivity, scope, and choice of law. The
chapter provides sample texts of typical forum selection clauses (pp. 231-32).
Also in this chapter is the authors' treatment of forum non conveniens and parallel
proceedings, including injunctions against foreign litigation.
The authors display their considerable learning and practical knowledge con-
cerning the problems of transnational discovery in chapter 5, Taking Evidence
Abroad. Their treatment covers issues pertaining to taking discovery in the ab-
sence of a treaty, such as the background and evolution of the standards of section
442 of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.
This chapter also deals comprehensively with discovery under the Hague Evi-
dence Convention and the aftermath of Soci&t Nationale Industrielle A~rospatiale
v. U.S. District Court.'4 Impressive depth in this field is evident throughout the
chapter, including in the questions posed (among them, whether state courts have
the "power ...to go beyond the minimum standard of deference to foreign
interests established by the Aerospatiale Court. For example, could a state court
conclude that international comity requires first use of the Convention in all
10. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
11. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
12. E.g., "Rationale for national contacts standard under the due process clause." (p. 105)
13. E.g., "How did the Asahi Court resolve [the] issue" of "whether the same limitations on
personal jurisdiction should apply to foreigners as are applied to U.S. citizens." (p. 92)
14. 482 U.S. 522 (1987). As with many other principal sections of the book, the authors begin the
section on the Evidence Convention with a footnote referring the reader to "extensive commentary" in
the field. Thus, they note (p. 411 n.129):
There is extensive commentary on the Hague Evidence Convention. E.g., Prescott & Alley, Effective Evidence-
Taking Under The Hague Convention, 22 Int'l Law. 939 (1988); Muse, Discovery in France and the Hague
Convention: The Search for a French Connection, 64 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1073 (1989); Born & Hoing, Comity and
the Lower Courts: Post-Aerospatiale Applications of the Hague Evidence Convention, 24 Int'l Law. 393 (1990);
Weis, The Federal Rules and the Hague Conventions: Concerns of Confornity and Comity, 50 U. Pitt L. Rev. 903
(1989) ....
More than fifteen other references in n. 129 are omitted for reasons of brevity.
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cases?") (p. 437). " The final chapters of the Born and Westin book cover foreign
sovereign immunity (chapter 6), jurisdiction in international litigation (both sub-
ject matter and extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction) (chapter 7), the act of state
doctrine (chapter 8), and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
(chapter 9). With respect to the act of state doctrine, Born and Westin includes
the following text and questions (pp. 664-65), which are illustrative of the book's
approach throughout in discussing cases it has presented:
The Sabbatino Court held that the act of state doctrine is a rule of federal common
law, binding on federal courts in both federal question and diversity cases. The Court
reasoned that Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), did not require application
of state law act of state rules because of the federal interest in the Nation's foreign
affairs. The Court also indicated that state courts would be required to apply an act of
state rule at least as deferential to foreign interests as the federal act of state doctrine,
376 U.S. at 425 n.23. Subsequent state court decisions have done so. [Citations omitted.]
.... What is the constitutional basis for federal courts to require state courts to obey
the rule of federal common law enunciated in Sabbatino? There is, of course, no "act
of state" statute. What permits federal courts not merely to dispense with Erie R.R. Co.
v. Tompkins, but also to fashion rules of federal common law binding on state courts?
The Court in Sabbatino declares that "an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding
the competence and function of the Judiciary and National Executive in ordering our
relationships with other members of the international community must be treated exclu-
sively as an aspect of federal law," because of the federal interests that "the rules of
international law should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial interpretations"
and in ensuring that U.S. judicial proceedings do not "hinder rather than further this
country's pursuit of goals ... in the international sphere." Is this persuasive?
The act of state doctrine articulated in Sabbatino is one of the leading examples of
federal common law in the international context....
Accepting the general power of the judiciary to fashion rules of federal common law,
is the act of state doctrine articulated in Sabbatino an appropriate exercise of this
authority? Does the risk of "divergent and perhaps parochial [state court] interpreta-
tions" in international cases justify a rule of federal common law? As noted elsewhere,
cases involving foreigners almost always raise issues of state law, whose interpretation
by state courts may well be divergent and perhaps parochial. Note that the Court appears
concerned by the danger of divergent and parochial interpretations of "international
law." Is there a special need for uniform interpretations of international law by U.S.
courts? Why?
The Born and Westin book's final chapter considers the enforcement of judg-
ments-one of international litigation's perennial hot topics-from the standpoint
of comity and the traditional exceptions to the enforcement of judgments, public
policy, and jurisdiction. The chapter also briefly discusses the Brussels Conven-
tion.
More than 100 pages (pp. 789-905) of appendices (A through L) follow the final
15. Born & Westin's treatment of this issue (as well as of other issues) was recently acknowledged
in Knight v. Ford Motor Co., 615 A.2d 297, 302 n. 12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992), which held
that under the facts of that case the Hague Evidence Convention should be the procedure of first resort
for discovery against a German corporate defendant.
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chapters. These appendices include the texts of the Hague Service Convention and
the Hague Evidence Convention (and declarations under those conventions), the
Inter-American Convention, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The
book has an extraordinarily detailed table of contents.
II. Lowenfeld
An English High Court judge has justly described Andreas F. Lowenfeld, a
noted professor at the New York University School of Law, as "a person of the
greatest academic distinction," whose expertise includes such fields as jurisdic-
tion and judgments.16 Professor Lowenfeld's book is not, however, a mere display
of academic learning. It reflects the author's extensive practical experience in
international law. He has achieved his twin goals (pp. v, vii) of writing a book
that will both appeal to teachers and be useful to practicing lawyers. The book
starts with public policy and the conflict of laws (chapter I), and continues with
jurisdiction to prescribe (chapter 11), judicial jurisdiction (chapter I1), interna-
tional arbitration (chapter IV), enforcement of foreign judgments (chapter V), the
act of state doctrine (chapter VI), foreign sovereign immunity (chapter VII), and
discovery of information located abroad (chapter VIII). The book's usefulness is
greatly aided by its excellent index and table of cases.
At the outset, Professor Lowenfeld points out that to some degree, "the book
offers an advanced course in civil procedure" and that it "also presents conflict
of laws in a transnational setting, and aspects of public international law, interna-
tional economic law, and comparative law and procedure" (p. v). The author is
not hesitant to offer his own comments and suggestions and to raise questions,
but is careful to distinguish his own views about what the law should be from
what the law is.
The introduction to the international arbitration chapter (chapter IV) is illustra-
tive of the type of illuminating textual treatment in which Lowenfeld's book is
rich (pp. 343-44 (footnotes omitted)):
In June of 1958, after many years of negotiation, a convention was signed at the
United Nations in New York concerning arbitration between private persons, "whether
physical or legal." The Convention was slow in gaining support. Neither the United
States nor the United Kingdom initially signed the Convention, and they did not accede
to the Convention until 1970 and 1975 respectively. Thereafter most states that had held
back (except some of the Latin American states) joined up. As of August 1992, some
89 states, including nearly all major commercial states, had become parties.
The basic idea of the New York Convention was to make arbitral awards rendered
in a foreign state enforceable in any state party to the Convention. Without such a
convention, it had often been difficult or impossible to enforce an arbitral award outside
the state in which the arbitration had taken place, where defendant might well not be
established or have assets. In order to enforce in state Y an award made in state X, it
16. Lowenfeld, p. 780, quoting X.A.G. v. A Bank, [1983] 2 All E.R. 464, [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep.
535 (Q.B. 1983).
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was often necessary to bring an action in X on the award and then to bring an action
in Y on the judgment of the X court. The New York Convention cuts through this
procedure, and provides, in Article I, that each Contracting State "shall recognize"
arbitral awards made in foreign states on the same basis as it recognizes and enforces
domestic awards.
The chapter's thoughtful comments and questions placed after the case extracts
are also typical of those in the other chapters, and the following are three examples
(pp. 365 (footnotes omitted), 366, 367):
Most commentators have criticized the holdings in McCreary and Cooper. For the
most part, however, courts in the United States have declined to permit pre-award
attachment in connection with international arbitrations, except in maritime claims. In
England it now appears possible to secure a Mareva injunction in aid of an arbitration
pending, or about to be initiated, in the United Kingdom, but not-at least as of year-end
1991-if the arbitration is pending elsewhere. As we saw in Chapter I, the Swissforum
arresti is available to secure an arbitral award, regardless of where the arbitration is
pending, if the other conditions for that device are satisfied.
The Audi-NSU v. Petit case is in many ways like Mitsubishi, in that in both cases
it is contended that a local law for protection of automobile dealers from the major
manufacturers can achieve its goal only if it is interpreted to be outside the permissible
scope of arbitration. Of course Mitsubishi reached the U.S. Supreme Court in the context
of Article II of the Convention, Audi in the context of Article V, but in both cases the
issue is whether the matter is capable of being arbitrated. Which is the sounder result?
To round out this chapter, one more question should be asked: If in negotiating a
transnational commercial agreement there is opportunity to insert a forum selection
clause, would you favor a judicial, or an arbitral forum? Of course, as the question is
stated, without any information about the nature or duration of the agreement, the
relation of the parties to each other, and whether one's client is more likely to be a
plaintiff or a defendant, it is hard to give a meaningful response. Even if one has all
of this information, one additional element must be considered before responding to the
question-how judgments rendered in one country are enforced in other countries. We
explore this subject in the next chapter.
Among the notable assets in Lowenfeld's book are the comparative law sec-
tions. For example, with respect to the recognition and enforcement ofjudgments,
the author presents not only U.S. law but also discusses the state of the law in
Europe under the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, and sets forth decisions of
the European Court of Justice (pp. 420-36). Similarly, on the subject of discovery,
Lowenfeld addresses English law and civil law on fact-gathering, which provides
a useful overview for the uninitiated. By way of illustration, Lowenfeld states in
part concerning the civil law system (pp. 670, 671 (footnote omitted)):
Discovery as understood in the common law-whether in the American or in the
English version-does not exist in the civil law system. Neither, in most civil law
countries, does the trial in civil (as contrasted with criminal) litigation, in the sense of
a consecutive period of time when witnesses give oral evidence in open court, first for
one side, then for the other. Though the principle of confrontation, i.e., of an adversary
proceeding before a neutral decision-maker, is maintained in all civil law countries, the
emphasis is much more on documentary proof of fact than on oral evidence, and much
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more on the responsibility of each side to gather its own evidence than on the obligation of
disclosure by the two sides to one another or participation by strangers to the controversy.
Typically, pleadings (two rounds for each side) are much more detailed than in the
United States or England. Factual assertions are set out as precisely as possible, and are
accompanied by a statement of how the assertion is to be established, normally by
reference to a document that is attached or is promised to be supplied, but also by
testimony of named witnesses (usually not by the parties themselves).
In principle, it is the judge (or one member of a collegial court) who is in charge of
gathering the evidence. The judge, not the parties, may summon witnesses to testify,
and the judge, not counsel, conducts the questioning. While counsel for both sides are
normally present when a witness is heard, and while counsel may suggest questions to
the judge, cross-examination in the Anglo-American model is not practiced in civil
litigation.
As for production of documents, most cases proceed on the basis of exchange of
documents between the parties; generally a party may not rely on a document not
included in its pleading file. The judge may, on his or her own motion or on application
of a party, order another party or a third person to produce documents if they are relevant
to an issue necessary for decision and are described with specificity. But applications
to the judge to order production of documents must be specific, or supported by selected
evidence.
The accompanying separately priced volume of Selected Treaties, Statutes, and
Rules is a vital resource to be used in conjunction with the main volume. More-
over, Professor Lowenfeld has prepared Teacher's Manual and Supplemental
Litigation Problems, which is available from the publisher to instructors using
the casebook in the classroom.
III. Comparisons and Conclusions
Each of the books reviewed here is a major work, and a welcome contribution
to the growing body of impressive writing in the field of international litigation.
They have been brought forth by authors of great distinction and authority in
international law, and the content is uniformly first-rate. Born and Westin's book
is more than a treatise, for it includes many features of a casebook. Lowenfeld
follows the format of a standard casebook, but his liberal amounts of illuminating
explanatory text make it more than a casebook. Each book contains dual strengths:
cogently presented black-letter law and materials that enable the reader to delve
more deeply and analytically into the key topics.
The two books share a number of elements. Their format, scope, and
purposes differ, but not surprisingly, they include most of the same topics.
Thus, each book covers such core international civil litigation subjects as judicial
jurisdiction, prescriptive jurisdiction, forum selection, service of process, taking
of evidence abroad, acts of state, foreign sovereign immunity, and enforcement
of judgments. Among some differences in coverage and emphasis are that Born
and Westin's book deals with service of process under the Hague Service
Convention more extensively than does Lowenfeld's, whereas non-U.S. law
generally is addressed more extensively by Lowenfeld than by Born and Westin.
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The two books, understandably, have reasonable differences in organization.
For instance, Born and Westin excerpt and discuss Laker Airways Ltd. v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines 7 in the forum selection chapter, under the
heading "Parallel Proceedings," whereas Lowenfeld excerpts in his chapter
on jurisdiction to prescribe.
To summarize, each of these works is a remarkably significant and comprehen-
sive contribution to the understanding of issues in international law that have come
to have increasing importance in U.S. litigation. Each of them will effectively
assist in the study and practice of law concerning those issues. They show that
international law need not be remote, impenetrable, or dull to the U.S. lawyer.
To a considerable extent they happen to complement each other very well, but
each book has no difficulty standing on its own. Each book's lucid analyses and
thought-provoking questions make it a useful and instructive work that undoubt-
edly deserves a valued place in the offices of civil litigators and in the classrooms
of aspiring litigators.
Edwin R. Alley"8
Nauru: Environmental Damage Under
International Trusteeship
By Christopher Weeramantry. Melbourne, Australia: Oxford University Press,
1992, pp. xx, 448, $72.00.
On August 10, 1993, the Australian prime minister, Paul Keating, and the
president of the island Republic of Nauru, Paul Dowiyogo, signed an out-of-court
settlement of a suit brought by Nauru in the International Court of Justice. Nauru
demanded compensation for environmental damage brought about by the Austra-
lians during the colonial period. Australia agreed to pay $US73 million to rehabili-
tate the island.' Nauru: Environmental Damage Under International Trusteeship
sets the stage for that case.
The coral island of Nauru, some eight square miles in size, sits alone, just south
17. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
18. Judge of the Superior Court of New Jersey. This review expresses the personal views of the
writer and not those of the New Jersey judiciary, and of course, these views are not binding on the
judiciary.
1. Nauru: Rocky Road to Recovery for Ravaged Pacific Island, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Aug. 10,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTER PRESs SERVICE File [hereinafter Rocky Road].
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of the equator in the Central Pacific, more or less to the north of Vanuatu and
the Solomon Islands. Nauru is home to about 8,000 people. A little more than
half of the population are of Nauruan (Micronesian) stock. The remainder consists
of a mixture of other Pacific islanders-Melanesian and Polynesian-some Chi-
nese, and some Europeans. When the European powers were dividing up the
small islands of the Pacific late in the nineteenth century, they found Nauru to
be blessed, or cursed, depending upon your point of view, with phosphate deposits
ideal for the production of fertilizer. These deposits were among the richest in
the world. Nauru was, accordingly, annexed to the German Empire in 1888 and
exploitation of the phosphate began.
The German administration surrendered to Australian forces in November of
1914. With the end of the War to End All Wars, the victors decided that they
would not annex Nauru as a spoil of victory. Instead they placed it under the
Mandates System of the League of Nations. Early in 1919 negotiations began
among Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, the three powers most closely
interested in Nauru's future and its resources. If Weeramantry is right, those
powers were cheerfully sharing out the spoils. Ultimately, in December 1920,
the League would confer on "His Britannic Majesty" a mandate to be exercised
jointly by the three governments. In practice, however, the three powers had
already finalized the basic deal that would govern Nauru (aside from a period of
Japanese occupation during the Pacific War) until its eventual independence on
January 31, 1968. No one consulted the Nauruans. The three powers called
the deal the Nauru Island Agreement of 1919. Under this agreement the three
governments decided that they alone would be entitled to the phosphates of Nauru,
supplied to them at cost rather than at the international market price. The key
administrative entity envisaged by this agreement was called the British Phosphate
Commissioners.2 The phosphate deposits were to be worked and sold under the
direction of three commissioners-one appointed by each government. The
agreement also provided that the administration of the island would be vested in
an administrator, appointed by the Australians, to whom the other two powers
delegated the day to day running of the venture. In reality, the commissioners
controlled the only significant commercial enterprise in the trust, and thus were
able to call the shots. When it suited them, the partner governments used the
facade of the commissioners (their own creation after all) to shield them from
2. For a fascinating study of the commissioners, see MASLYN WILLAMS &BARRIE MAcDONALD,
THE PHOSPHATEERS: A HISTORY OF THE BRITISH PHOSPHATE COMMISSIONERS AND THE CHRISTMAS
ISLAND PHOSPHATE COMMISSION (1985). In addition to Nauru, the commissioners ultimately extracted
phosphate from Banaba and Christmas Island. The Banabans, a mere colony rather than a Trust
Territory, thought the powers had taken advantage of them. They took their chances in the English
courts where the judge offered some strong words about the over-reaching of the colonial power, but
found no legal principles under English law upon which to base relief for the Crown's breach of
fiduciary duty. Tito v. Waddell, [1977] 3 All E.R. 129. As will be seen below, the Nauruans placed
their faith on international law.
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accountability to the League and the United Nations-and ultimately to the Nau-
ruans. With the demise of the League of Nations the territory came under the
United Nations Trusteeship, but the same basic arrangement continued.
As Weeramantry describes, during the mandate and trusteeship periods the
island exported some 34 million tons of phosphate, leaving about one-third of the
plateau that represents the main habitable land on the island totally unusable. (The
dust jacket of his book contains an amazing photograph of the surface-of-the-moon
style coral pinnacles that remain after extraction.) Nauruans received but a small
fraction of the proceeds of sale. Those proceeds were, moreover, much less than
the phosphate would have obtained on the open market. Phosphate moneys paid
for the administrative costs of the island. The money also paid for machinery and
equipment-which Nauruans had to buy back from the phosphateers as part of the
agreement leading to independence! In short, the whole "trust" relationship looks
very much like one of simple exploitation.
Since independence in 1968, the Government of Nauru has controlled the
phosphate industry, "and phosphate has been mined since then on the basis of a
clear acceptance by the government of its obligation to restore to a usable condition
the land mined." (p. xiii) Since resources are likely to run out in the next few
years, and with them a substantial income, there is some urgency in planning for
the future. Offers of resettlement by the administering powers did not work out,
and the future of the Nauruans seems, as a practical matter, to be bound up with
rehabilitation. (While the Government of Nauru has been doing much better in
terms of phosphate price and has acquired substantial investments in the period
since independence, some of those investments have been disastrous.3 )
In December 1986 the Government of Nauru appointed a three-person Indepen-
dent Commission of Inquiry to inquire and report on two main issues: (1) which
government or organization should accept responsibility for rehabilitating the
areas of phosphate land worked out in the periods covered by the German adminis-
tration, the League of Nations mandate, the Japanese occupation, and the United
Nations trusteeship; and (2) the cost and feasibility of any proposed rehabilitation.
Christopher Weeramantry, then a Professor of Law at Monash University in
Melbourne, chaired the commission. As its lawyer member, he was primarily
responsible for writing the parts of the report of the commission dealing with legal
issues. The present book is a lively summary of the legal arguments regarding
responsibility in the report the commission rendered to the Government of Nauru
in 1988' and includes sufficient factual background to place the arguments in
context.
The commission concluded that the three partner governments were obligated
3. See David North, Where Has the Money Gone?, PAC. ISLANDS MONTHLY, Aug. 1993, at 25.
4. The Nauruan Government did not respond to a request for a copy of the full report. It
presumably discusses the legal arguments as well as questions of the technical feasibility of rehabilita-
tion. The latter issue is not addressed in Weeramantry's summary.
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under principles of state responsibility to rehabilitate the lands mined out during
their stewardship. Weeramantry's book discusses a number of theories affirming
this obligation, including basic principles of trusts; the express provisions of
article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations,5 article 76 of the Charter of
the United Nations,6 and their spirit and intendment; the undertakings under the
mandate and trusteeship agreements; abuse of power and undue enrichment;
violation of sovereignty over natural resources; and violations of principles of
environmental law. Weeramantry does not fully flesh out all of these arguments,
but the case he makes is very persuasive.
The report of the commission led to the proceedings in the International Court
of Justice known as Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia). The
book does not discuss these proceedings, now settled,7 but some reference to
them helps place the book in context. Steering through all of the procedural and
substantive shoals must have been a nightmare for the Republic's advisers, and
the proceeding certainly seemed like a long-shot. Nauru is not a member of the
United Nations, and it was therefore necessary for Nauru to become a party to
the Statute of the Court pursuant to article 93 of the United Nations Charter.'
Nauru deposited its instrument of acceptance of the Statute on January 29, 1988,9
and made a broad declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
the same day.'o It lodged an application against Australia with the Court on May
13, 1989, essentially adopting the arguments contained in the Weeramantry book.
The court dismissed Australia's preliminary objections in June 1992. " Australia
based its most serious objections 2 on the absence from the proceeding of New
5. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 1, provided:
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty
of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves
under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and
developtent of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust
should be embodied in this Covenant.
6. U.N. CHARTER art. 76 proclaims as "basic objectives" of the trusteeship system "to promote
the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants."
7. Rocky Road, supra note 1.
8. U.N. CHARTER art. 93, para. 2, provides: "A state which is not a Member of the United
Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice on conditions to be
determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council."
The General Assembly adopted the appropriate resolution of approval on November 18, 1987. 1990-
1991 I.C.J. Y.B. No. 45, at 55 (1991).
9. 1990-1991 I.C.J. Y.B. No. 45, at 55 (1991).
10. Id. at 91.
11. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240, 268 (June 26).
12. Australia also based some arguments on the circumstances surrounding the "settlement"
reached at independence, upon the role of the Trusteeship Council as arguably the sole mode of
resolving trusteeship disputes, and on the delay in bringing the proceedings. Id. at 247-53. These
arguments were all dismissed by an overwhelming majority of the Court. Id. at 268. In its memorial
Nauru also laid claim to the Australian share of the final distribution of the overseas assets of the
British Phosphate Commissioners made by the three powers in 1987. Id. at 265. This claim had not
been expressly made in its application and was dismissed by the Court on the basis that it amounted
to a new claim and that the subject of the dispute originally submitted to the Court would be transformed
if the Court entertained the claim. Id. at 267.
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Zealand and the United Kingdom, her two colonial partners. 3 In a situation where
the Australians had wielded the laboring oar in the administration since 1920, the
majority of the Court distinguished its decision in the Monetary Gold case 14 and
held that the absence of the other two countries did not bar further proceedings.
After the book was written and accepted for publication, Professor Weeramantry
became Judge Weeramantry of the International Court of Justice. He did not
participate in the preliminary objections phase of the case.
The story of Nauru is a microcosm of our time. It raises some of the most
fundamental legal and political issues of the late twentieth century-among them,
the aftermath of colonialism, the transfer of resources, the relationship of a people
to its land, protection of the environment, the nature of state responsibility, the
question of remedies under international law, and the role of third-party dispute
settlement.
One of the many issues on which this fine study should stimulate further debate
is the performance of the Trusteeship Council (and before it the Permanent Man-
dates Commission) in protecting the inhabitants of trust territories. Much of the
literature on the Council is relatively laudatory. After all, the mandate/trusteeship
system established the principle of international accountability through a regular
reporting system. The trusteeship system included a fairly sophisticated examina-
tion of petitions and regular visiting missions to the territories. The Trusteeship
Council was involved in referendums and other efforts to assess the will of peoples
under the system. But one has to wonder how far the system was protecting the
interests (and territories) of the inhabitants of the Marshall Islands as the United
States conducted its nuclear testing there in the forties and fifties-the legacy of
which still remains. One has to wonder how well the Republic of Palau has been
protected in its struggle to maintain its nuclear-free constitution in the face of
opposition from its administering power.' 5 One has to wonder how well the
Council protected the interests of the Northern Mariana Islands as it entered into
a permanent relationship with the United States without any serious effort to
13. I have not seen any official explanation of why the other two countries were not joined. The
New Zealand acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court, however, contains an exception of
disputes in respectof which any other party to the dispute has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice only in relation to or for the purpose of the dispute; or where the acceptance of the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction on behalfof any other party to the dispute was deposited or ratified less than twelve months
prior to the filing of the application bringing the dispute before the Court ....
1990-1991 I.C.J. Y.B. No. 45, at 92 (1991). The United Kingdom's acceptance contains an almost
identical exception and also excepts "disputes with the government of any other country which is a
Member of the Commonwealth with regard to situations or facts existing before 1 January 1969."
Id. at 105. (Nauru is a special member of the Commonwealth.) Under the settlement, Nauru assigned
all its claims against the United Kingdom and New Zealand to Australia. Rocky Road, supra note 1.
Apparently they had not been persuaded to contribute to the settlement beforehand.
14. Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr., U.K. and U.S.), 1954 I.C.J. 19,
32 (June 15) (Court unable to proceed where interests of party not before the Court would "form
the very subject-matter of the decision").
15. R. CLARK & S. RoFF, MICRONESIA: THE PROBLEM OF PALAU (Minority Rights Group Report
No. 63, 2d ed. 1987).
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consider whether the United Nations' own standards for an acceptable exercise
in self-determination had been fulfilled.
16
If Weeramantry and the Nauruans are right, supervision of the Nauru Trust was
of a piece with these less than heartening cases. Just as the Marshall Islanders and
the Palauans seem to have made more than their fair contribution to the defense of
the "free world," so do the Nauruans appear to have made a disproportionate
contribution to the agricultural well-being of their administering powers-to the fields
of England, the wheat lands of Western Australia, and the grasslands and pine forests
of New Zealand. Who was watching on behalf of the Nauruans? Well, strangely
enough, a few people were. Their views were simply drowned as the majority of
the Council went along with what the administering powers wanted. Chapter 9 of
Weeramantry's book is entitled (ironically?) "Trusteeship: Theory and Practice."
It contains a number of statements and questions by representatives of countries such
as India, Guatemala, the USSR, Liberia, Mexico, and Haiti, which showed that
somebody was watching as the foxes guarded the chickens. But not enough of them!
This book is full of outrage, the way Nauru was once full of phosphate. It is
worth mining.
Roger S. Clark
Distinguished Professor of Law
Rutgers University School of Law-Camden
Die Deregulierung des Linienluftverkehrs im
Europaischen Binnenmarkt [The Deregulation
of Scheduled Air Transport in the European
Single Market]
By Georg W. Wenglorz. Heidelberg, Germany: R.V. Decker's Publishers, 1992,
pp. xvi, 166, DM88.00.
The European Single Market has been in existence since January 1, 1993. On
the same date, with few exceptions, the third phase of the liberalization of the
16. Roger S. Clark, Self-Determination and Free Association: Should the United Nations Termi-
nate the Pacific Islands Trust?, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 75-78 (1980). Note the way the Security
Council (the ultimate authority in that instance) swept the issue under the carpet in its discussion of
terminating the trust, refusing even to hear the views of the governor of the Northern Marianas. See
U.N. Docs. S/22034 (1990) and S/PV.2972 (1990).
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European Community (EC) scheduled air services came into effect. At the present
moment, an assessment as to the actual effects this liberalization will have on the
European aviation industry cannot be made.
The disappearance of the traditional phenomenon of the "national carrier"
need not be synonymous with the elimination of the still existing national carriers
from the market. Although some of these carriers will certainly disappear in
the coming decade, European air traffic will ensure its own survival, generally
speaking, through cooperations and mergers (also with overseas partners).
Although Georg Wenglorz's work, The Deregulation of Scheduled Air Trans-
port in the European Single Market, dates from 1992, it has not lost any of its
topicality, at least not for the reader who is able to add to the picture outlined by
Wenglorz events that have occurred subsequently. Credit is due to the author
initially for his meticulous record of the development of European liberalization.
However, in the second chapter, in which the subject of deregulation is explained,
this reviewer admittedly had hoped for a brief comparison with American deregu-
lation, especially since the author uses this term throughout rather than the term
"liberalization," which is more often used for the European development.
The account of the development from the legal beginnings (the Chicago Con-
vention/Bilateral agreements) up to the EC Treaty and the first memorandum of
the Commission is excellent. Additionally, the description of the background and
content of the first and second stages of liberalization is also dealt with very
graphically.
The interested reader will find Chapter X nothing short of absorbing. In this
chapter, Wenglorz attempts to outline a model example of the aviation free market
system within the European Single Market. The danger of such an undertaking
is, of course, that it must be measured against the reality. Whether the reality will
develop in the same direction as the author's model example is certainly doubtful.
Generally the ideal and the reality seldom coincide, particularly if one adopts a
strict economic stance, such as that adopted by the author. For example, the
author expresses the following opinions: the "exemption of tariff coordination
... is to be ended without replacement" (p. 144); an "effective subsidy control
by the Commission [cannot] be dispensed with" (p. 145); "prices should be
deregulated" (p. 145); "the question of security and its supervision can, and
should be, regulated separately from the question of price formation" (p. 145);
and the "agreement on tariffs between the commercial aviation companies [must]
be abolished" (p. 145). The author adds that "[tihe permission for the aviation
companies in the Community to fly over any inner-community routes they choose
to serve, should be called for" (p. 146) and "[flurthermore, the system of naming
airline companies after the particular nation state . . . should be abolished in
relation to inner-Community air traffic" (p. 146). In respect of capacity the author
states that "all national restrictions must be lifted" (p. 147).
The main points of the measures demanded by the author can now be found
in the content of the third liberalization phase, in which the model example of the
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author has already been realized to a large extent. However, this realization has
only occurred as far as the legal aspects are concerned. The question of whether
the desired results will take place and more competition will actually ensue still
remains to be seen. At the moment, the possibility that events in Europe will be
a repetition of those in the United States cannot be ruled out: the battle of the
giants leads not only to the downfall of a few competitors, but leaves the remaining
companies economically battered-or rather, more battered than they already are.
A division of the market, that is, less competition, would be the immediate
unavoidable outcome.
Furthermore, it is difficult to assess how the airline companies of non-Member
States, whose connection with the new aviation free market system is (correctly)
demanded by Wenglorz, will cope with this development. The EC has just con-
cluded a treaty with Norway and Sweden at the level of the second liberalization
phase, which is justifiable in view of their connection (Scandinavian Airlines
System) to the EC Member State Denmark. The European Free Trade Association
(EFTA) states have applied for a connection at the level of the first liberalization
phase; Hungary is hesitating over at which stage it should enter. A prognosis on
the survival of the airline companies of these states may be gloomy in any case
with the complete liberalization contemplated by the author. The reviewer finds
it difficult to describe such a situation as a "model example." Independently from
such differences of opinion, Wenglorz's work is, even on this issue, of great
importance. The development up to January 1, 1993, is not only the past, but for
the potential Members of the EC is also the present and probably the future.
Prof. Dr. Elmar Giemulla
Berlin, Germany
Attorney at Law (New York)
Comparative and Private International Law:
Essays in Honor of John Henry Merryman
on His Seventieth Birthday
Edited by David S. Clark. Berlin, Germany: Duncker & Humblot, 1990, pp. xxii,
450, DM198.00.
The contributions to this edition of essays in honor of John Henry Merryman
reflect the variety of fields of law covered by Merryman's scientific work as well
as the origin of authors who have been influenced by Merryman throughout the
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world. The greater number of essays deal with comparative law, the area in which
scholars have made most productive use of Merryman's work.
In his introductory laudatio Mauro Cappalletti gives a very personal picture of
his acquaintance and friendship with Merryman. This encounter in the early
sixties between a young European lawyer, at variance with the dogmatic attitude
at home, and the realistic attitude of an outstanding American lawyer is typical
of the fascination felt by a whole generation of European lawyers.
In part one of the book, John Henry Merryman and Comparative Law, David
S. Clark, co-author with Merryman of Comparative Law: Western European
and Latin American Legal Systems, starts with a scrutinizing view of one of
Merryman's central themes in his essay, The Idea of the Civil Law Tradition.
"Tradition" is opposed to systems, a distinction that is characteristic in Mer-
ryman's work. The broader concept of tradition allows a better insight into the
different legal systems in Europe in convergence.
In the next essay H6ctor Fix-Zamudio undertakes an account of the state of the
art of comparative law and the place Merryman occupies in it in John Henry
Merryman and the Modernization of Comparative Legal Studies. Symptomatic of
this contribution from the Latin world, where realistic attitudes toward law offer
important enrichment, is the reminder of the formal dimension of law. The interest
in legal tradition is a complement, not an alternative, to comparison of law. Only
when the author deplores the lack of educative material in comparative law does
he make a weak point.
In his article Some Thoughts on Comparative Legal Culture Lawrence M.
Friedman takes up Merryman's central theme. He opposes a traditional compari-
son of law that moves from legal rules as its units to a comparison on a more
comprehensive level. The comparison of legal cultures is not the comparison of
the legal systems as they are known from the traditional classifications. Legal
culture is determined by social structure. Friedman is conscious of how de-
manding the task is. To approach a comparison of legal cultures he offers mostly
hints of where criteria could be found. In a realist attitude he finds the best
evidence of legal culture in a mix of behavioral indicators and careful surveys of
attitudes.
The second part of the book, Comparisons of Legal Systems, begins with
an impressive piece of comparison by Hans W. Baade, Springs, Creeks, and
Groundwater in Nineteenth-Century German Roman-Law Jurisprudence with a
Twentieth-Century Postscript. Despite its title, this contribution's scope reaches
from Mexico to Germany in its synchronous dimension and from Roman to
modem law in its diachronous dimension. It covers geographic, climatologic,
social, and other aspects of the theme and delivers a detailed example of the
difficulties of abstract rule forming. Baade also provides a short sketch of the
development of German private law in the nineteenth century. Baade creates a
dramatic dimension to the essay when at the end, he returns to Ulpian's commen-
tary, quoted at the beginning of the essay, thereby closing the circle-modem
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hydrology having changed the basic understanding of the problem. Nothing seems
to be wrong with traditional comparison if done with such erudition.
Mirjan Damalka in Atomistic and Holistic Evaluation of Evidence: A Compara-
tive View presents a short survey offering a clue to the understanding of the
distinctions between the Anglo-American and the Continental legal process-a
contrast lawyers outside the United States are familiar with at least from television
series. Damalka shows, after theoretical and historical elucidations, the implica-
tions of the different approaches to evaluation of evidence involved in the adminis-
tration of criminal and civil justice.
In another article, American and European Models of Constitutional Justice,
Louis Favoreu stresses the difference between the American "judicial review"
and the European "constitutional review." He concludes that a divergence in the
understanding of the nature of legal orders is the basis for the difference, not to
mention institutional and political factors. Before enumerating common elements
in the American and the European model, the author points out their distinctive
features. Among these the most important seem to be the placing of constitutional
litigation outside the judicial power in Europe and the erga omnes effect of the
decisions in Europe.
Gino Gorla, in his article Samuel Livermore (1786-1833): An American Fore-
runner to the Modem "Civil Law-Common Law Dialogue," analyzes a scholar
who documents in his writings a mind that comprises both legal traditions. Gorla
concludes that civil law offers the scientific instruments needed also in the forma-
tion of common law-systems.
Carlos Jos6 Gutierrez in La Constituci6n Norteamericana como Ley Importada
en Costa Rica adds an argument to the importance of legal tradition in comparison
of law. Even though the constitution of Costa Rica has been modeled after the
U.S. Constitution, a civil law attitude towards legislative supremacy regarding
legal norms maintains a strong hold in Costa Rica.
Jan Hellner deals with a rather specific problem in Interpretation of Contracts
under the Influence of Statutory Law. The intersection of statutory interpretation
and contract interpretation on one side and the impact of mandatory and facultative
statutory rules on the other side create problems for which the author cannot offer
one solution that would be valid in all systems. He leaves the reader with the
advice to observe the development in the different areas concerned.
Hein Kotz, in his article Scholarship and the Courts: A Comparative Survey,
follows Merryman's advice to open the view of comparative science and continues
work done by Merryman himself. His subject is the citation practice in judgments
that differs in a characteristic manner in different countries. Kotz has no ready
explanation, but his observations and his speculations about possible reasons give
a plausible first orientation and valuable indications for everyone who works in
this field.
Latvia's 1937 Civil Code: A Quest for National Identity, by Dietrich Andr6
Loeber, turns our attention to a region hidden from the interest of legal science
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for half a century. In his short sketch Loeber helps to close the gap. The national
identity of one of the Baltic states is the subject here, but it should be clear that
this is a facet of European legal identity.
The longest article of the collection is Inga Markovits's Socialism and the Rule
of Law: Some Speculations and Predictions. The author herself has been surprised
by the categorical decline of socialism during the last years; she states this in a
postscript. Nevertheless her article has not become legal history overnight. To
the contrary, her meticulous comparison and the insights she achieves raise the
fear that with vanishing socialism an incentive for comparison and consciousness
in Western legal culture might be lost.
Barry Nicholas, in Certainty of Price, is concerned about different attitudes
that may arise in interpretation of article 55 of the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. After a comparative review of
regulations in different legal orders and a sophisticated analysis of the problem,
he states the need for certainty of price for a valid contract.
In La justicia penal en la investigaci6n socio-juridica deAmerica Latina [Crimi-
nal Justice in Latin American Sociolegal Research] Rogelio Perez Perdomo differ-
entiates the picture of criminal justice in Latin America. This very open-minded
account with its call for more sociolegal research reminds the geographically
distant reader of a world where legal problems have a very nonacademic and
painful reality.
The resemblance of institutions of Roman and English law is one of the myster-
ies of the legal universe. Giovanni Pugliese discusses one of these resemblances,
fus Honorarium and English Equity, in his contribution. In this essay he corrobo-
rates the perspective of a comparison of law that stresses the concordances. In
his vision the integration of equity and common law in England would help English
law and civil law to come closer on their way to harmonization.
Two of the contributions deal particularly with institutions of common law. In
both cases lawyers from the civil law tradition have chosen institutes as subjects
that are notoriously difficult concepts to grasp. In both articles the reader can
sense a certain anxiety about getting lost in what Lord Diplock called the maze
of common law, but both contributions courageously help to bridge the schism.
Denis Tallon writes about The Notion of Contract: A French Jurist's Naive
Look at Common Law Contract. Tallon concentrates mainly on terminology used
in English law that may mislead the French lawyer. Here could be added that in
civil law, too, the concepts of "contract," "obligation," and "debt" are not
used uniformly. The comparison with English law adds an important facet to the
discussion and it demonstrates the need for further research in this field.
The second contribution dealing with institutions of common law is Justin P.
Thorens's article The Common Law Trust and the Civil Law Lawyer. Besides the
analysis of the basic principles of property in common law, this essay undertakes
to list the dogmatic steps civil law has to take in order to be able to incorporate
the trust. The author finds seven of them. The trust has lately attracted much
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interest on the European continent as a model for security rights. In this respect
Thorens's article could be understood as a warning.
Striking differences in legal culture and in the understanding of judicial proce-
dure are brought to the surface in Yasuhei Taniguchi's Civil Liability of Experts
in Court: A Comparative Overview. His findings are astonishing enough when-
as in his article-the role of experts is inspected in such classical fields as medicine,
technique, and economy. These conclusions can be alarming when the dependence
on experts in new fields like information technology is taken into account. In this
respect Taniguchi's article has importance far beyond questions of liability.
In a critical survey Carlos Viladis reports in Obras de arte y Patrimonio Hist6r-
ico en Espafia: Una reforma legislativa reciente [Works of Art and the Historical
Patrimony in Spain: A Recent Legislative Reform] the content of the Spanish His-
torical Patrimony Law enacted in 1985. Though the law apparently shows progress
in protection, the author has doubts concerning the legislative technique and he
criticizes the lack of harmonization with international agreements.
The third part of the collection is titled The Convergence and Integration of
Legal Systems within Europe. In the first essay in this part, EEC Community-
Building Under the Single European Act, George A. Bermann examines the effects
of the Single European Act. Bermann finds the Act a disappointment only for
those who expected a constitutional reform of the European Community. The
achievement of the Act lies for him in the means it contemplates for attaining the
completion of the common internal market. He sees the neofunctionalist tradition
in European cooperation continued that aims at harmonization starting from coop-
eration in particular sectors.
Besides his introduction, Mauro Cappelletti contributes an article, Balance of
Powers, Human Rights, and Legal Integration: New Challenges for European
Judges. In this article Cappelletti explains the reasons for the expansion ofjudicial
review in Europe since World War II: the abandonment of the rigid sdparation
des pouvoirs, the human rights movement, and "transnational pluralism." This
last factor is documented by the reviewing activity of the European Court of
Justice in Luxembourg and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
In the outcome Cappelletti sees a movement of convergence not only in Europe,
but more generally in the whole Western world.
The subject of Sabino Cassese's Toward a European Model of Public Adminis-
tration is public administrative law, a field where comparison has been rather
scarce until now. The article starts from the development of Italian administrative
law and the influences it got from France. In the end the scope is broadened to
a general movement of convergence, where the role of the European Community
is seen as one factor in addition to the similarity of social needs.
J.A. Jolowicz touches very sensitive points of harmonization of private law in
the European Community when he gives an account of the background and the
different implementations of the directive in his essay, Product Liability in the
EEC. This very informed and overtly written critique points at serious shortcom-
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ings in the actual legislative practice in the European Community. Even where
the basic principles are agreed upon, the influence of interested parties, govern-
ments, and lobbying groups is apt to adulterate the objective of harmonization.
Jolowicz sticks to his subject, product liability, but the problem is much more
general. Imminent danger exists that the project of harmonization will lead to a
severe loss of legal culture. If help can be expected it will be from a scrutinizing
analysis like this one.
The fourth and last part of the book is titled Private InternationalLaw. InInterna-
tionalism in Private International Law Heikki Jokela first draws our attention to
Jitta, an author who lived in the beginning of this century. Jitta has remained in
the background of the discussion in international private law for decades, perhaps
because of his internationalistic attitude, which has not been favored by influential
writers. Jokela shows that actual development has produced many international
instruments that directly or indirectly deal with questions of international private
law. Jitta's model of thinking could help to elucidate a situation that is difficult to
cope with by the various existing schools of private international law.
Stefan A. Riesenfeld writes on Transnational Bankruptcies in the Late Eighties:
A Tale of Evolution and Atavism. Riesenfeld cites recent cases in France, Ger-
many, England, and the United States that all demonstrate the concurrence of
local and foreign creditors in cases of bankruptcy. It is fascinating to see in this
report how a matter resists abstract rule-forming even where the goal seems to
be clear-the paritas creditorum. Bankruptcy is thus not only the touchstone of
private law, but also of the willingness of national legislation to recognize the
rights of foreigners, thus the basis of international private law. The subtitle Riesen-
feld has given to his article indicates that evolution in this field is slow and tedious.
The facts of the case reported by Kurt Siehr in The Return of Cultural Property
Expropriated Abroad belong happily to the past. He relates a practice of the East
German government that was known as a policy to obtain foreign currency. The
question arises whether this violated public policy of Western Germany. The
author gives a very differentiated account of the legal situation, tracing the prob-
lems on both levels, conflict rules and rules of material law.
The scientific level of discussion is-though of course not homogeneous-high
throughout the contributions. Adherence to Merryman's ideas is found as well as
criticism. The essays of this volume, together with the bibliography of Mer-
ryman's oeuvre in the fifth part, form a valuable basis for further discussion. In
this sense the collection gives an overview of the current state of the art in an
important sector of comparative law. Perhaps this is the best one can receive as
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International Estate Planning
By Charles G. Stephenson, K. Bruce Friedman, and Nicholas S. Freud. New
York, New York: Matthew Bender & Company (Erin M. Breslin, 518/487-3000),
1992, 1 looseleaf volume, updated, $120.00.
"You can't tell a book by its cover" is a familiar aphorism. In this case, you
can't tell the book by its listed authors. This book is a collection of chapters or
essays, nearly all of which are written by persons other than the author-editors
listed on the title page.' This practice is not unusual, but as the papers in the
anthology vary in style and quality, the reader needs to be sensitive to variations
in the usage of terminology. The author-editors and the other authors are all well
regarded persons of extensive experience in international estate planning, and the
general quality of the papers is quite high. Some of the chapters are written in
the style of continuing legal education lectures, sometimes more general in the
treatment of complex issues and not as adequately supported by source notes as
one might wish.
The editorial organization of the book is excellent, with a section-by-section
summary, headnote style, preceding each chapter. This summary places in context
a particular problem the reader may be exploring. The introductory overview in
chapter 1 is particularly helpful. The seven illustrative case studies presented in
chapter 1 set the scene for recognizing potential problems, not only as regards
taxation, but also as regards the interests of family members and the administrative
complications that arise on the death of an estate owner. The handling of matters
in both planning and administration of estates with international aspects requires
constant attention to the jurisdictional reach of the different nations involved.
Such attention is particularly necessary in light of the strong and divergent national
policies regarding family protection in family property, as well as tax policies,
because different nations are involved during a time period that extends over the
lifetime of the persons interested. In this multilevel consideration of social and
legal issues, the elements to be borne in mind are so multiplied by the number
of persons, states, locations of assets, and time periods that advisers sometimes
tend to get blindsided in their concentration on facts as they exist at the time of
consultation.
Conflict of law doctrine and development, treated in chapter 2, is of particular
importance in international estate planning. The jurisdictional reach of the nations
1. Only chapters 1 and 7 carry no designation of specific authorship. Presumably these were
written by Stephenson, Friedman, or Freud. The authors indicated for the other chapters are: Ch.
2, Arlene Harris and Charles G. Stephenson; Ch. 3, Edward P. Nelson; Ch. 4, Norman A. Glickman
and Francis A. La Poll; Ch. 5, Paul Gordon Hoffman; Ch. 6, L. Frank Chopin; Ch. 8, David J.
Hayton; Ch. 9, Carl L. Estes II; Ch. 10, Glenn A. Zahler; Ch. 11, George M.U. Young; Ch. 12,
Griffith Way; Ch. 13, Justin Thorens; Ch. 14, Maurice C. Cullity, Q.C.
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involved can be exercised by reason of judicial power either over assets or over
individuals. As a consequence, most planning techniques depend largely on the
juridical location of assets.2 In many instances, because of the alternative forms
in which property interests may be formulated or characterized, the situs of assets
is generally more easily maneuvered than are the locations or relationships of
family members, their citizenship, or domicile. The persistent relationships that
family members have with each other and the nations in which they live are an
integral part of their individual life styles controlled by motivations and circum-
stances normally independent of estate planning. In modem conflict of laws, this
phenomenon means that the law is often even more narrowly directed to particular
issues than in other areas, and social policies may more accurately predict results
than older legal precedent. As the authors point out in § 2.03, the current approach
in the United States and elsewhere is to apply the law that will further the policies
of the country having the dominant interest in the particular matter or narrow
issue. Issues concerning the relationships involved in the concepts of domicile or
habitual residence are illustrative. Few would dispute that while most married
couples live together and have common domiciles, each may acquire a separate
domicile if the factual circumstances and requisite intention are present.3 The
suggestion that this is only "a trend in the United States toward recognizing the
right of a married woman to choose her own domicile" 4 seems a timorous reliance
on older learning that has been overcome by more recent developments.
The importance of identifying the particular issue for which the applicable law
is being considered is particularly significant in separating matters relating to
ownership of assets by a decedent and succession of those assets at the owner's
death. The distinction between the ownership concepts of marital or community
property and the succession of the share of a deceased spouse needs to be clearly
maintained to avoid a blurring of the analysis. In the example (p. 2-40) of a French
couple selling community assets in France and moving their domicile to Virginia
where they invested the proceeds of the French assets in Virginia land, Virginia
would, in all probability, recognize each spouse's half interest in the Virginia
land.5 On the death of the first to die, the succession of that decedent's share
would be determined by the law applicable to succession of the decedent's estate,
here Virginia, which is both the domicile of the decedent and the situs of the asset
in question. Virginia would permit the devise of the decedent's share free of
claims of the surviving spouse or children. This variation in the succession from
French law is explained by the authors as a loss of a community property interest,
but is more aptly described as a different applicable succession law. The succes-
2. See CHARLES G. STEPHENSON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING § 2.03, at 2-9 &
§ 2.09[4], at 2-42.
3. See, e.g., EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 4,33-.35 (2d ed. 1992).
4. STEPHENSON, supra note 2, § 2.04, at 2-14.
5. See Uniform Disposition of Community Property Rights at Death Act § 1.1, 8A U.L.A. 125
(1983); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-197 to -206 (Michie 1950).
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sion issue is not dependent on the law applicable at time of acquisition, as is the
marital property ownership, but rather on the circumstances of the decedent at
the time of death.6
A somewhat analogous blurring of the author's analysis appears in the discus-
sion of jurisdiction.7 In speaking of jurisdiction of a court, care must be taken to
identify the purpose for which jurisdiction is assumed, for example, to grant
original probate of a will, to issue original or ancillary letters to administer local
assets, to construe a will, to enforce contribution based on distribution elsewhere,
to hear claims of creditors, to collect tax, or to allocate taxes paid elsewhere. Any
of these procedures may involve different necessary or discretionary bases for
asserting jurisdiction and the reach of any resulting decree will vary depending
on the jurisdictional basis for the court's order. 8
In somewhat of a contrast, chapters 3 and 4 are detailed discussions of the U.S.
tax consequences of U.S. contacts by nonresident aliens. Both chapters provide
precise information with frequent reference to underlying case, statutory, or treaty
authority. While one deals with estate and gift taxes and the other income tax,
the understanding of the role of treaties in these two areas is aided greatly by
reading both chapters to get the "feel" of the approach likely to be taken in future
cases.
Chapter 5, Transfer Taxation of U.S. Citizens and Residents with Foreign
Involvement, like the prior two chapters, is very well done. The detailed discus-
sion of the factors indicative of domicile is particularly helpful. 9 One of the traps
for the unwary attorney and client is the handling of the marital deduction for
transfers to a spouse who is not a U.S. citizen.'" Many lawyers, concentrating on
the fact that the decedent, or donor, was a U.S. citizen might assume the marital
deduction would be available. However, because the marital deduction is in theory
only a postponement of the tax payment, it is not available for direct transfers to
the noncitizen surviving spouse who may die outside the United States, beyond
the U.S. tax collector's reach. The author treats this matter in detail, including
the utilization of the Qualified Domestic Trust which satisfies the purpose of the
marital deduction by assuring the collection of the U.S. estate tax on the death
of one or other spouse."
Chapter 6, Multijurisdictional and Separate Situs Wills, is a good commentary
on single or separate wills dealing with assets in different countries. This chapter
presents most of the advantages and disadvantages relating to each and cautions
6. However, in their next example (STEPHENSON, supra note 2, § 2.09[4], at 2-42), involving
forced shares of a decedent's family member, the distinction between ownership and succession issues
seems to be recognized in the quasi-community property setting.
7. Id. § 2.06, at 2-23 to -24.
8. Cf. id. § 2.07, at 2-30.
9. Id. § 5.03[c], at 5-8.
10. Id. § 5.05, at 5-16.
11. Id. § 5.06.
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the reader on the care necessary in the use of separate wills for assets in different
jurisdictions. The problems incident to revocation issues and the construction of
residuary clauses would appear sufficient to deter the use of separate wills in any
but the most unusual circumstance.
The chapter 6 discussion of habitual residence as used in the 1988 Hague
Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession of Estates of Deceased Persons
suggests the ambiguity surrounding intent as an element in both domicile and
habitual residence. In both the American concept of domicile of choice" and the
concept of habitual residence as used by the Hague Conference 13 intent is a factor
in identifying the person's home and center of living, the attitude that forms the
genuine focus of the person's personal affairs. It is not an expression of intention
to obtain or retain a "legal domicile," and these latter expressions or declarations
are usually regarded as of minor weight. In using habitual residence the Hague
Convention emphasizes those facts that evidence factors indicative of the person's
primary home, including the mental attitude making it the center of personal life.
Those facts control, thus avoiding the older view, particularly as reflected in
English law, of revival of domicile of origin and of requiring intent to remain
permanently. This reviewer submits that domicile of choice as currently devel-
oped in American law and habitual residence as used in the Hague Convention
are nearly identical.
The author of chapter 6 raises a major difficulty that follows from the scission
of traditional U.S. conflict of laws rules in referring to situs of immovables (real
property) and to domicile for movables (personal property) in succession.14 The
matter of characterizing modem investments such as bonds, mortgages, coopera-
tives, limited partnerships, condominiums, time shares, and trust interests as real
or personal property is an uncertain, difficult, expensive process that invites
manipulation and retaliation in international estates. Fortunately, in much of the
world scission is avoided, and in the United States, the courts and legislatures are
moving to limit the situs rule to its reasonable application. Serious conflicts
scholars have long criticized the situs rule, 5 and many authorities have recognized
that the state in which land is located has a reasonable interest in regulating land
use, title records, and taxation, but except for matters of national security, has little
12. See id. § 2.04; see also ScoLEs & HAY, supra note 3, § 4.14, 4.20.
13. Donovan W.M. Waters, Explanatory Report, Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to
Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons para. 51 (art. 3), in 2 HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH SESSION 549 (1990).
14. STEPHENSON, supra note 2, § 6.05[2], at 6-17; see also A.N. Yiannopoulos, Movables and
Immovables in Louisiana and Comparative Law, 22 LA. L. REV. 517 (1962).
15. Moffatt Hancock, In the Parish of St. Mary le Bow, in the Ward of Cheap, 16 STAN. L. REV.
561 (1964); Russell J. Weintraub, An Inquiry into the Utility of "Situs " as a Concept in Conflicts
Analysis, 52 CORN. L.Q. 1 (1966); J.H.C. Morris, Intestate Succession to Land and the Conflict of
Laws, 85 L.Q. REV. 339 (1961); Peter Hay, The Situs Rule in European and American Conflicts
Law-Comparative Notes, in PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION-EsSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN
E. CRIBBIT 109 (Peter Hay & Michael H. Hoeflich eds., 1988).
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or no interest in the allocation of ownership interests among family members.
1 6
In international estates nearly all U.S. states and most developed nations,
without regard to the nature of the assets, recognize wills that satisfy the formali-
ties of the place of execution or the habitual residence (domicile) of the testator
either at the time of execution or time of death.17 Parties will have difficulty
invalidating a will that was validly executed under any law a prospective testator
would contemplate. The remaining primary issue in succession of international
estates relates to family protection, that is, the forced share for spouse and chil-
dren. Nearly half the American states have statutory choice of law rules as to the
entire estate referring this issue to the domicile of the decedent at death as the
most significantly interested state.'" Most of these statutes are patterned after
section 2-201(c) of the Uniform Probate Code.' 9 Only by this unitary reference
can the state that is most concerned with the family give effect to its policy
concerning family protection in the entire estate of a deceased person.20
In chapter 6 the author observes that "secrecy and the limitation of claims are
two of the primary purposes of separate wills.,21 Without considering the prickly
issues of the propriety of assisting a client to avoid creditors whose assets have
contributed to the estate, one should note that the constitutional obligations of
notice to creditors afford a substantial reason for utilizing the single will.
22
Chapter 7, Income Taxation of Foreign Trusts, is a detailed treatment of tax
and reporting obligations regarding foreign trusts, including the complexities of
accumulation distributions utilizing the throwback rules.
Chapter 8, Trusts Under Civil Law Jurisdictions, discusses the utilization of
Anglo-American trusts under the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to
Trusts and on their Recognition (1985) and in civil law states that are not parties
16. See Eugene F. Scoles, Choice of Law in Family Property Transactions, 209 RECUEIL DES
CouRs 11, 63 (Hague Academy of International Law, 1988).
17. See STEPHENSON, supra note 2, § 6.04, at 6-11.
18. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-70 (1991); ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.070 (1985); CAL. PROB.
CODE § 120 (Deering 1991); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 15-11-201 (1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12,
§ 901(b) (1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-201(b) (West 1964); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 700.282(b) (1980); MINN. STAT. § 524-2-201(b) (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-702 (1991);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-01 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 114.105 (1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 2202 (1975); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 30-5A-1 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-201 (1993);
WIS. STAT. § 766.75 (1993); Wyo. STAT. § 2-5-101 (1977).
19. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-201(c) (1990): "Non-Domiciliary. The right, if any, of the surviving
spouse of a decedent who dies domiciled outside this State to take an elective share in property in
this State is governed by the law of the decedent's domicile at death."
20. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1. 1-A(C)(7) (Consol. 1992), effective Sept.
1, 1992, identifying the decedent's assets from which the surviving spouse may claim is most direct:
"The decedent's estate shall include all property of the decedent, wherever situated." Cf. UNIF.
PROB. CODE §§ 2-201, 2-202, 2-205 & 2-207; Eugene F. Scoles, Conflict of Laws and Nonbarrable
Interests in Administration of Decedents' Estates, 8 U. FLA. L. Rav. 151, 172 (1955); see also
Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Mass. 1984).
21. STEPHENSON, supra note 2, § 6.06[21, at 6-21.
22. See Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988); cf. Blake v.
McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898).
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to the trust convention. The discussion helpfully cautions readers about the over-
riding effect of matrimonial property in civil law jurisdictions. The utilization and
limitations on alternatives or analogous arrangements are explored in imaginative
fashion.
Chapter 9, Asset Protection Trusts for Foreign Persons, deals with protecting
the assets of the actual or potential economic or political foreign refugee. This
chapter includes a sophisticated discussion of the Act of State Doctrine, its excep-
tions, and modifications in connection with trusts designed to avoid expropriation
by a foreign government. This chapter is one of the most detailed and informative
in the volume even though it deals with some rather unusual circumstances. Of
particular value is the author's development of the concepts and utilization of a
trust "protector" as an independent "advisor" or holder of power to name a
successor trustee or to move the trust situs. The chapter includes valuable sug-
gested forms and drafting techniques.
Chapter 10, Reporting and Disclosure Requirements for Foreign Persons, de-
tails the necessary tax returns regarding sources of income in the United States
together with the nontax disclosure requirements of foreign investors under other
laws of the United States.
Chapter 11, England and Wales, is the first of the final four chapters presenting,
on a country-by-country basis, the law most relevant to the American estate
planner. Chapter 11 is a helpful outline of succession law and estate administration
as well as the law on tax obligations and payment. Particularly emphasized are
the differences between England, a common law jurisdiction, and Scotland, which
has civil law in large measure. Both systems are compared to those of Northern
Ireland and Wales. One of the most valuable portions of this chapter describes
England's summary process of obtaining probate and letters. The English proce-
dure is so simple it may surprise many American practitioners in states that have
not adopted the somewhat analogous provisions of the Uniform Probate Code.
Chapter 12, Japan, presents an interesting comparison of the traditional Ameri-
can system of estate administration and that of Japan, which utilizes the civil law
system of universal succession. Under the concept of universal succession the
successors, testate or intestate, pay debts and taxes and arrange distribution pursu-
ant to the will or statute without court intervention. The chapter explains Japan's
tax law in detail.
Chapter 13, Switzerland, describes that country's particularly complex setting
of federal law governing succession and choice of law, while Canton law controls
the tax structure. The civil law system of universal succession and forced heirship
exist in Switzerland, but the surviving spouse also has a forced share of the
decedent's portion of the marital property. While Swiss law does not provide for
trusts as the Anglo-American common law knows them, its courts and legal
professionals have considerable experience with foreign trusts and local alterna-
tive arrangements. A significant factor is the general recognition of choice of law
clauses, or professio juris, by which one can choose to have the courts apply the
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law of either the testator's domicile or nationality. The Hague Convention on the
Law Applicable to Succession of the Estates of Deceased Persons takes this later
approach.
Chapter 14, Canada, details the Canadian tax system, which has no estate or
inheritance tax as such, but does have both federal and provincial income taxes
that include capital gains. For most persons the appreciation of assets is taxed
whenever a transfer or a "deemed" transfer occurs, against which the parties
credit the general lifetime exclusion of $100,000. The substantive law of the
provinces, other than Quebec where civil law obtains, is patterned after English
law, including family protection similar to the English Family Provision Act.
Important variations occur among the provinces, but most follow earlier English
practice with regard to probate and estate administration. Local ancillary adminis-
tration must usually be had of assets in Canada belonging to a decedent domiciled
elsewhere. An interesting aspect of the Canadian income tax on capital transfers
is the provision that trusts are deemed to dispose of capital assets every twenty-one
years, and any appreciation tax, if not attributed to beneficiaries, is taxable to the
trust. The legislative pattern for this tax still is unsettled and calls for careful
review.
As was suggested at the outset, this book differs from a traditional treatise. It
is broad ranging and the various authors have somewhat dissimilar approaches.
However, the editorial organization brings the variant parts together to give
rational unity to the symposium. The fact that nearly all the chapters are well done
makes the book a valuable and readable addition to the library of the lawyer whose
clients have international contacts and concerns.
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